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FREE TO DISCRIMINATE: 
COLEMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND LEAVES STATES WITH 
AN INCENTIVE TO HIRE MEN OVER WOMEN 
Courtney Newsom* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Gender discrimination in the workplace comes in two forms: 
unequal treatment and unequal opportunity.
1
 All too often, a remedy 
to combat one perpetuates the other. For example, a law that combats 
unequal opportunity by addressing the special needs of pregnant 
women also perpetuates the view that women should be treated 
differently than men—discriminatory treatment.
2
 Congress took 
eight years to carefully construct the Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993
3
 (FMLA or “Act”), which it believed struck the perfect 
balance between providing women with equal treatment and equal 
opportunity in the workplace by including a self-care provision with 
the family-care provisions.
4
 The Supreme Court, however, did not 
agree. 
The FMLA, when adopted, included four provisions.
5
 The first 
three provisions are collectively referred to as the family-care 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Communication 
Studies, December 2002, University of Tulsa. I am grateful to Daniel Straw and all of the Loyola 
of Los Angeles Law Review editors for their hard work and dedication. I am also grateful to my 
parents and my husband for their support and understanding during this writing process. 
 1. Unequal treatment concerns the way in which women are treated as employees, such as 
whether women are treated differently than men. Unequal opportunity concerns the ability of 
women to participate in the workforce, including whether men are favored over women in hiring 
decisions. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1340 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (presenting the viewpoints of equal-treatment feminists and equal-opportunity 
feminists). 
 2. H.R. REP. NO. 101-28, pt. 1, at 14 (1989). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1993), declared unconstitutional by Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
 4. Id. § 2601; Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1350 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 2612. In 2008, Congress added a fifth provision to the FMLA, which 
requires employers to grant eligible employees up to twelve workweeks of leave if the employee 
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provisions and require employers to provide eligible employees with 
up to twelve workweeks of leave per year to care for a new child or 
an ill family member.
6
 The fourth provision, referred to as the self-
care provision, requires employers to provide eligible employees 
with up to twelve workweeks of leave per year when a serious health 
condition makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his 
or her position.
7
 
In a 5–4 decision with no majority opinion, the Supreme Court 
held in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland
8
 that Congress did 
not have the power to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity by 
passing the self-care provision of the FMLA.
9
 In other words, 
Congress could not grant an employee the right to sue his or her 
employer for violations of the self-care provision if the employer was 
a state or state entity.
10
 As a practical matter, Congress has the power 
to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity only when the legislation 
attempts to remedy or prevent due process or equal protection 
violations.
11
 The Court did not believe that Congress had made 
sufficient findings to justify a belief that the FMLA would serve to 
perpetuate unequal opportunity for women if the Act only sought to 
combat unequal treatment of women in the workplace —that is, if it 
contained only the family-care provisions.
12
 The Court’s decision 
stands in stark disagreement with its earlier opinion in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,
13
 which held that 
Congress had the power to abrogate the states’ immunity when it 
passed the family-care provisions of the FMLA.
14
 
This Comment argues that the plurality opinion in Coleman 
ignored the express congressional findings used to justify the FMLA 
 
has a qualifying exigency that arises because an immediate family member is on (or has been 
called to) active duty in the armed forces. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D), declared unconstitutional by 
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
 6. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
 7. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D), declared unconstitutional by Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 
132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
 8. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 9. Id. at 1338. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59–72 
(1996) (establishing that Fourteenth Amendment is the only source of Congress’s power to 
abrogate). 
 12. 26 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). 
 13. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 14. Id. at 740. 
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that the Court had previously confirmed in Hibbs. Part II outlines the 
circumstances that brought Coleman to the Supreme Court. Part III 
details the historical framework of the FMLA by exploring some of 
the congressional findings that led to its passage and considering the 
Supreme Court’s view of those findings in Hibbs. Part IV presents 
the rationales of the competing Coleman opinions. Part V analyzes 
the plurality opinion in Coleman, contrasting it against both the 
dissenting opinion and the Hibbs majority opinion. Part VI concludes 
that by taking away an employee’s ability to seek a monetary remedy 
for a state’s violation of the self-care provision of the FMLA, the 
Supreme Court has left the states with an incentive to hire men over 
women, leaving the states economically free to discriminate in the 
hiring process. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Daniel Coleman worked as executive director of procurement 
and contract administration at the Maryland Court of Appeals.
15
 In 
his sixth year of employment, Coleman requested sick leave “based 
upon a documented medical condition.”
16
 The day after Coleman’s 
request, one of his supervisors gave him the choice to either resign or 
be terminated.
17
 Because the FMLA required the Maryland Court of 
Appeals to grant Coleman the leave, Coleman sued his employer in 
federal court for, inter alia, violating the Act.
18
 
A U.S. district court in Maryland dismissed the suit after the 
state asserted sovereign immunity despite the FMLA’s express 
provision that it applies to “any employer (including a public 
agency).”
19
 The district court based this decision in part on Fourth 
Circuit precedent that held that the entire FMLA was an 
unconstitutional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
20
 But the 
Supreme Court had overruled that decision in Hibbs, at least insofar 
 
 15. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332–33 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
 19. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, No. L-08-2464, 2009 WL 8400940, at *1 (D. Md. 
May 7, 2009); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2006). 
 20. Coleman, 2009 WL 8400940, at *1. 
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as the family-care provisions were concerned.
21
 Nevertheless, the 
district court found there was “universal agreement of the Federal 
Courts of Appeals” that Congress’s abrogation of “state sovereign 
immunity with respect to the FMLA’s self-care provision” was 
unconstitutional.
22
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.
23
 The 
court agreed with the four other circuits to address the issue, finding 
that Congress could not constitutionally abrogate states’ sovereign 
immunity in the self-care provision of the FMLA.
24
 The court 
provided two reasons for its decision. First, the legislative history of 
the FMLA showed that “gender discrimination was not a significant 
motivation of Congress’s decision to include the self-care 
provision.”
25
 Instead, “Congress included that provision to attempt to 
alleviate the economic effect on employees and their families of job 
loss due to sickness and also to protect employees from being 
discriminated against because of their serious health problems.”
26
 
Second, even if Congress had intended the self-care provision to 
protect against gender discrimination, “Congress did not adduce any 
evidence establishing a pattern of the states as employers 
discriminating on the basis of gender in granting leave for personal 
reasons.”
27
 
III.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  The FMLA 
The FMLA requires an employer to hold an eligible employee’s 
job open for up to twelve weeks a year in the event that the employee 
needs to take family or medical leave for one of the following: 
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the 
employee and in order to care for such son or daughter. 
 
 21. Id. at *2 (citing Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2001)). When analyzing the 
FMLA, courts have distinguished the first three provisions (family-care) from the fourth 
provision (self-care). See id. at *1. 
 22. Id. at *2. At that time, the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had addressed the issue. Id. 
 23. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 24. Id. at 193. At the time of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the Fifth Circuit had joined the 
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning on this issue. Id. at 194 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the 
employee for adoption or foster care. 
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or 
parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or 
parent has a serious health condition. 
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the 
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of 
such employee.
28
 
To enforce these provisions, “[t]he Act creates a private right of 
action to seek both equitable relief and money damages ‘against any 
employer (including a public agency)’ that ‘interfere[s] with, 
restrain[s], or den[ies] the exercise of’ FMLA rights.”
29
 By detailing 
that “any employer” includes a “public agency,” Congress explicitly 
sought to make the Act enforceable against the states despite their 
sovereign immunity.
30
 
Congress detailed its “[f]indings and purposes” in section 2601 
of the Act, which helped justify its decision to abrogate state 
immunity and explain its reasoning behind passing the FMLA.
31
 
Specifically, Congress declared that “employment standards that 
apply to one gender only have serious potential for encouraging 
employers to discriminate against employees and applicants for 
employment who are of that gender.”
32
 To combat this and its other 
findings, Congress expressed that one of the Act’s purposes was “to 
promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and 
men.”
33
 
B.  Constitutionality 
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution grants the states 
sovereign immunity from suits for damages brought under federal 
law.
34
 However, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives 
Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees of Section 
 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006), declared unconstitutional in part by Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
 29. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (citations omitted) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) and § 2615(a)(1)). 
 30. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333 (plurality opinion). 
 31. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601. 
 32. Id. § 2601(a)(6). 
 33. Id. § 2601(b)(5). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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1 of that Amendment—the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.
35
 This enforcement power means Congress can pass 
legislation that either remedies or deters violations of rights 
guaranteed by Section 1.
36
 Such legislation can be enforced against 
the states if Congress both (1) makes “its intention to abrogate [the 
states’ sovereign immunity] unmistakably clear in the language of 
the statute”
37
 and (2) tailors the legislation “to remedy or prevent 
conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
provisions.”
38
 
In order to evaluate the second requirement, the Supreme Court 
developed a “congruence and proportionality” test in City of Boerne 
v. Flores.
39
 The test requires (1) identifying the “evil or wrong that 
Congress intended to remedy” or prevent
40
 and (2) assessing “the 
means Congress adopted to address that evil.”
41
 Legislation passes 
the test if there is “congruence and proportionality between the injury 
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”
42
 
In Hibbs, the Supreme Court applied the congruence and 
proportionality test to the FMLA’s family-care provisions.
43
 The 
Court looked at the evidence of gender discrimination in order to 
determine what harm Congress was attempting to remedy.
44
 By 
framing the constitutional harm as the “pervasive sex-role stereotype 
that caring for family members is women’s work,” the Court found 
that the first Boerne step was met.
45
 The Court noted that Congress 
had evidence that state employers were as guilty of succumbing to 
the sex-role stereotype as private employers.
46
 This alone, it 
reasoned, was enough to justify “Congress’ passage of prophylactic 
 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5; Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333. 
 36. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333. 
 37. Id. (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 38. Id. (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 639 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 40. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank., 527 U.S. at 639) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Id. at 1334 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520). 
 42. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520). 
 43. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003). 
 44. See id. at 729. 
 45. Id. at 731, 737 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)). 
 46. See id. at 729. 
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§ 5 legislation.”
47
 But the Court then continued its analysis by 
looking specifically at the maternity-leave provision and found that 
the disparate treatment in leave policies further evidenced the 
widespread stereotype.
48
 The Court held that the FMLA family-care 
provisions satisfied the last step in the Boerne test because the 
“across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible 
employees . . . ensure[d] that family-care leave would no longer be 
stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female 
employees, and that employers could not evade leave obligations 
simply by hiring men.”
49
 Additional restrictions on the applicability 
of the Act caused the Court to find that the FMLA was sufficiently 
tailored to the “targeted violation.”
50
 
IV.  RATIONALE OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court issued four opinions in Coleman. Justice 
Kennedy authored the plurality opinion, which only three Justices 
joined.
51
 Justice Ginsburg authored the dissent, which also had three 
Justices join.
52
 Justice Thomas, who joined the plurality opinion, 
authored a concurrence, while Justice Scalia authored an opinion 
concurring only in the judgment.
53
 
A.  The Plurality Opinion 
The plurality began with a synopsis of Hibbs, explaining that the 
Supreme Court had “permitted employees to recover damages from 
states for violations of [the FMLA’s family-care provisions].”
54
 It 
thereby reaffirmed the early finding of the Hibbs Court that 
 
 47. Id. at 730. 
 48. Id. at 731. 
 49. Id. at 737. 
 50. Id. at 739–40. Additional restrictions include that the act “requires only unpaid leave”; is 
applicable “only to employees who have worked for the employer for at least one year and 
provided 1,250 hours of service within the last 12 months”; excludes from coverage “employees 
in high-ranking or sensitive positions, . . . state elected officials, their staffs, and appointed 
policymakers”; and mandates that “[t]he damages recoverable are strictly defined and measured 
by actual monetary losses, and the accrual period for backpay is limited.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 51. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito joined in the plurality opinion. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined with the dissent in full, and 
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent with the exception of 
footnote one. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1338 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 54. Id. at 1334 (plurality opinion). 
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“Congress [had] relied upon evidence of a well-documented pattern 
of sex-based discrimination in family-leave policies,” which included 
facially discriminatory policies and facially neutral policies that were 
administered in a gender-biased way.
55
 Both practices “reflected 
what Congress found to be a ‘pervasive sex-role stereotype that 
caring for family members is women’s work.’”
56
 Justice Kennedy 
framed the Hibbs decision as “conclud[ing] that requiring state 
employers to give all employees the opportunity to take family-care 
leave was ‘narrowly targeted at the faultline between work and 
family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and 
remains strongest.’”
57
 
The plurality opinion then rejected three arguments that 
Coleman presented to justify why Congress had the power to 
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity when it passed the self-care 
provision of the FMLA.
58
 
First, the plurality rejected that “[t]he self-care provision 
standing alone addresses sex discrimination and sex stereotyping.”
59
 
It could not find any basis for concluding that sick-leave policies 
were facially discriminatory or administered in a discriminatory way, 
nor did it believe there was any evidence of a stereotype that women 
take more sick leave than men.
60
 The Court found that Congress’s 
intent in passing the self-care provision did not relate to gender; 
rather, Congress was concerned about discrimination based on illness 
and the economic hardships families faced with illness-related job 
loss.
61
 
Second, the plurality did not agree that “the [self-care] provision 
[was] a necessary adjunct to the family-care provisions” sustained in 
Hibbs.
62
 Coleman had argued that without the self-care provision, 
employers would assume that women would take more family-care 
leave and would thereby have an incentive to hire men over 
women.
63
 He urged that the self-care provision was an attempt to 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)). 
 57. Id. (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738). 
 58. See id. at 1334–37. 
 59. Id. at 1334. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1335. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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remedy the discrimination in hiring that would result from the 
enactment of the family-care provisions, rather than an attempt to 
remedy discrimination in the leave policies.
64
 The plurality rejected 
this argument because “Congress [had] made no findings, and 
received no specific testimony, to suggest the availability of self-care 
leave equalizes the expected amount of FMLA leave men and 
women will take,” and because the argument could not pass the 
Boerne test.
65
 
Third, the plurality rejected Coleman’s argument that the self-
care provision served to help single parents keep their jobs when 
they became ill.
66
 The plurality declared that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not protect against this suggested evil.
67
 This was 
true even if most single parents were women because the provision at 
most attempted to remedy “employers’ neutral leave restrictions 
which have a disparate effect on women.”
68
 Disparate impact alone 
is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation.
69
 The plurality, 
therefore, held that the self-care provision, under this rationale, was 
“out of proportion to its supposed remedial or preventative 
objectives.”
70
 
The plurality concluded that Congress had no authority to 
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when it passed the self-care 
provision of the FMLA.
71
 It noted, though, that the immunity only 
applied to suits for money damages.
72
 Individuals can still sue state 
employers for violations of the FMLA. While individuals cannot 
recover money damages, they may get their jobs back.
73
 
Additionally, the plurality noted that a state “may waive its immunity 
or create a parallel state law cause of action.”
74
 
 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. at 1335–36. 
 66. See id. at 1337. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000)). 
 71. Id. at 1338. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 1337–38. 
 74. Id. at 1338. 
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B.  The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent would have held that the self-care provision “validly 
enforce[d] the right to be free from gender discrimination in the 
workplace” and was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
75
 The dissenting Justices 
found that two distinct justifications supported this conclusion.
76
 
Under the dissent’s primary rationale, the self-care provision 
was directed at sex discrimination because it sought to protect 
pregnant women.
77
 Justice Ginsburg cited the legislative history, 
including the competing political views, to show that there was 
conflict even among feminists in how to frame laws (such as the 
FMLA) to ensure that women’s rights were protected without 
singling women out.
78
 The dissent found that Congress attempted to 
resolve this conflict by creating the self-care provision, which 
protected pregnant women without treating them differently than 
anyone else with a disability.
79
 Justice Ginsburg further argued that 
“pregnancy discrimination is inevitably sex discrimination,” a 
conclusion that she argued the Court was wrong to deny roughly 
forty years earlier in Gedulig v. Aiello.
80
 Finally, the dissent reasoned 
that the self-care provision was congruent and proportional to 
protecting women from pregnancy discrimination because it 
separated gender-neutral parental care from the female-only 
disability that follows childbirth.
81
 Furthermore, the provision was 
necessary to protect women who needed more leave than sick-leave 
plans provided because their pregnancies were exceptionally taxing 
or they needed to recover from a miscarriage or a stillborn 
childbirth.
82
 The inclusion of all disabilities, rather than only 
pregnancy did not “mean that the provision lack[ed] the requisite 
 
 75. Id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
 76. See id. at 1339–47. 
 77. Id. at 1340. 
 78. Id. Women’s rights advocates were split into two groups: “equal-treatment” feminists 
and “equal-opportunity” feminists. Id. Equal-treatment feminists wanted laws that did not 
distinguish between men and women. Id. Equal-opportunity feminists wanted laws that would 
overcome the burdens placed on women. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1340–41. 
 80. Id. at 1345. In Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974), the Court concluded that 
discrimination on basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination because an entire class of females 
would never become pregnant. Justice Ginsburg roundly criticized Aiello’s rationale and argued 
that the Court should have expressly repudiated it. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1345, 1347 & n.6. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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congruence and proportionality to the identified constitutional 
violations” because Congress had ample evidence that singling out 
pregnancy would result in gender discrimination in hiring.
83
 
Second, the dissent believed that the Court could have held that 
the self-care provision validly applied to states because it prevented 
the gender discrimination in hiring that would necessarily have 
followed had the self-care provision not been included in the 
FMLA.
84
 Congress was attempting to alleviate the stereotype that 
“caring for family members is women’s work.”
85
 Employers viewed 
the passage of the parental and family-care provisions as women’s 
benefits.
86
 Therefore, without the self-care provision, the FMLA 
would lead employers to view men as more favorable job 
candidates.
87
 The dissent thus found the self-care provision necessary 
to “lessen the risk that the FMLA would give rise to the very sex 
discrimination it was enacted to thwart.”
88
 
Overall, Justice Ginsburg could not separate the self-care 
provision from the parental- and family-care provisions.
89
 The 
FMLA, in her opinion, was a total package designed to provide 
women with both equal opportunity and equal treatment in the 
workplace.
90
 The focus on gender discrimination in the Act made it a 
valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
91
 
C.  The Concurring Opinions 
The concurring Justices were not concerned with the nuances of 
how the self-care provision related to gender discrimination.
92
 In 
their views, it was irrelevant to analyzing Congress’s power in this 
instance.
93
 Justice Thomas believed that “Hibbs was wrongly 
decided” because Congress did not have sufficient evidence of a 
 
 83. Id. at 1346. 
 84. Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)). 
 85. Id. at 1347 (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 1347–48. 
 88. Id. at 1349. 
 89. See id. at 1350. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 1338 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1338–39 (Scalia, J. concurring in the 
judgment). 
 93. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring); id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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“demonstrated pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States” when it passed the family-care leave provisions, and there 
was even less evidence concerning the self-care leave provision.
94
 
Justice Scalia argued that the Boerne test is arbitrary and unhelpful.
95
 
He believed that the plurality and dissent each applied the test 
faithfully, yet their vastly different conclusions evinced the 
uselessness of the test.
96
 Instead, Justice Scalia would limit 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 enforcement power to 
legislation that enforces the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as those provisions were envisioned when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was passed—legislation concerning racial 
discrimination alone.
97
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The self-care provision of the FMLA must pass the Boerne test 
in order for the Court to consider it a valid abrogation of the states’ 
sovereign immunity. The first step requires identifying the 
unconstitutional behavior that Congress was attempting to prevent.
98
 
The second step assesses the law to determine if it is “congruent and 
proportional” to achieving its goal.
99
 
A.  The Self-Care Provision Actually Attempts to 
Prevent Employment Discrimination 
The plurality in Coleman ignored the predominant theme that 
permeates both the Hibbs analysis and the Act’s congressional 
findings and purposes in concluding that there was no nexus between 
gender discrimination and the FMLA’s self-care provision.
100
 The 
 
 94. Id. at 1338 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 1338–39; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 98. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997). 
 99. See id. at 520. 
 100. Compare Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (plurality opinion) (stating there is no nexus 
between gender discrimination and the self-care provision), with 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (stating 
that a purpose of the Act is to “minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on the 
basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for [an] eligible medical reason . . . on a 
gender-neutral basis”), Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (stating 
that employers relied on stereotypes about the allocation of family duties because they were so 
deeply rooted), Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1347–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (identifying public 
employers that admitted they would discriminate in hiring if only required to grant parental 
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theme in both was that the Act was attempting to overturn the 
“pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for families is women’s 
work.”
101
 The plurality took from Hibbs only that Congress had 
found evidence that family-leave policies differentiated or were 
administered differently based on sex.
102
 However, Hibbs had arrived 
at this conclusion by focusing on the overarching stereotype that 
Congress was trying to stifle.
103
 By ignoring the end goal of the 
FMLA, the plurality could also ignore the strong evidence that the 
self-care provision was necessary for the family-care provisions to 
work.
104
 
Justice Ginsburg, who was in the majority in Hibbs, did not miss 
this sleight of hand.
105
 Her dissent began with the admonition that 
“the plurality undervalues the language, purpose, and history of the 
FMLA, and the self-care provision’s important role in the statutory 
scheme.”
106
 She also declared that “the plurality underplays the main 
theme of our decision in Hibbs.”
107
 Then, she detailed the competing 
agendas of women’s rights activists (equal-treatment feminists and 
equal-opportunity feminists) that influenced the final scope of the 
FMLA.
108
 
However, in her primary rationale, Justice Ginsburg digressed 
from this foundation and instead focused on the self-care provision 
as a remedy for pregnancy discrimination.
109
 Her attempt to hinge 
the self-care provision on pregnancy discrimination was simply too 
great a stretch. First, it required making the leap that disability meant 
pregnancy. Then, it required making the additional leap that 
pregnancy could be equated with the female gender to arrive at the 
conclusion that the self-care provision, which proscribed 
discrimination based on disability, actually proscribed discrimination 
based on sex. 
 
leave), and S. REP. NO. 101-77, at 32 (1989) (“Legislation solely protecting pregnant women 
gives employers an economic incentive to discriminate against women in hiring policies; 
legislation helping all workers equally does not have this effect.”). 
 101. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731. 
 102. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335–38 (plurality opinion). 
 103. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729. 
 104. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1336–38. 
 105. See id. at 1339–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1340. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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Although the dissent presents a valid argument, it suffers from 
defective logic because it is based on false premises.
110
 The first 
premise is clearly underinclusive because there are a number of 
disabilities other than pregnancy. The second premise is somewhat 
less obvious, but is nonetheless underinclusive. Although only 
females may get pregnant, not all females will or even can get 
pregnant. In other words, there is an entire class of females that will 
never be in the class defined by pregnancy—a fact the Supreme 
Court recognized thirty-eight years earlier in Aiello.
111
 It is 
unfortunate that Justice Ginsburg went down this road because her 
alternative argument is far more persuasive; however, as it stands, 
that argument is underdeveloped and gets lost in the dissenting 
opinion. 
Although the dissent attempted to take the congressional 
findings a bit further than they can logically go, the dissent caught 
what the plurality missed (or ignored).
112
 Indeed, it would be hard to 
miss unless one purposely tried to ignore it.
113
 Congress listed its 
findings and purposes in the text of the statute.
114
 The list was neither 
long nor confusing, and it included six findings and five purposes for 
enacting the FMLA.
115
 Express in those findings and statements of 
purpose was a clear congressional intent “to promote the goal of 
equal employment opportunity for women and men.”
116
 
It is clear from the congressional record that the self-care 
provision was an attempt to proscribe the employment discrimination 
that would result if the FMLA was enacted with only the family-care 
 
 110. NICHOLAS CAPALDI, THE ART OF DECEPTION 96–97 (1987). 
 111. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). 
 112. Compare Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (plurality opinion) (“There is nothing in particular 
about self-care leave . . . that connects it to gender discrimination.”), and id. at 1347–48 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that Congress adduced evidence that employers would 
regard required parental and family-care leave as a woman’s benefit), with 29 U.S.C. § 2601 
(2006) (stating that a purpose of the FMLA was to “minimize[] the potential for employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available . . . on a gender-
neutral basis”), Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“The FMLA aims 
to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”), and S. REP. 
NO. 101-77, at 32 (1989) (“Legislation solely protecting pregnant women gives employers an 
economic incentive to discriminate against women in hiring policies; legislation helping all 
workers equally does not have this effect.”). 
 113. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
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provisions.
117
 As the Court recognized in Hibbs, Congress was well 
aware of the stereotype that family care was a woman’s job.
118
 If 
Congress knew that the stereotype was prevalent, then there was 
ample reason for Congress to believe that employers would 
determine that an Act with only a family-care provision was a benefit 
only for women.
119
 
The plurality’s error lies in its attempt to subject the self-care 
provision to the same analysis the Court used in Hibbs to analyze the 
family-care provisions, as though the provisions could be evaluated 
in the same way.
120
 Of course the self-care provision would fail if 
evaluated under the same criteria as the family-care provisions. 
Congress passed the family-care provisions to remedy gender 
discrimination and the self-care provision was passed to prevent it.
121
 
Both entitle Congress to invoke its Section 5 power to abrogate the 
states’ sovereign immunity, but they cannot be evaluated in the same 
way.
122
 For example, the Court cannot require Congress to adduce 
evidence of an established pattern of gender discrimination by the 
FMLA when it comes to hiring post-FMLA.
123
 There will not be a 
pattern of gender discrimination to adduce when Congress has not 
passed the law that will create it. 
Instead, the Court should have used the Hibbs analysis as a 
starting point for what the Court had already determined regarding 
congressional findings and purposes. Then, the Court could have 
applied the congruence and proportionality test to determine if there 
was a sufficient nexus between the self-care provision and the 
potential for employment discrimination as a result of the family-
care provisions. If Hibbs were used in this way, there would have 
been no denying that Congress had sufficient “reason to believe” that 
it was preventing unconstitutional behavior when it passed the self-
 
 117. Id. § 2601(b)(4)–(5). 
 118. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003). 
 119. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1347–48 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 120. The plurality at one point calls both the family-care and the self-care provisions 
preventive. Id. at 1336 (plurality opinion). 
 121. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6). 
 122. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–30 (1997). 
 123. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (plurality opinion) (“But States may not be subject to suits 
for damages based on violations of a comprehensive statute unless Congress has identified a 
specific pattern of constitutional violations by state employers.” (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 
at 532)). 
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care provision.
124
 The Court could also have relied on the Hibb 
Court’s reasoning that the limited applicability of the Act made it 
sufficiently tailored.
125
 The dissent pointed out this approach, but 
unfortunately it lost credibility when it attempted to equate the self-
care provision to a remedy for pregnancy discrimination.
126
 
B.  The Self-Care Provision Is 
Congruent and Proportional to Its Goal 
of Preventing Employment Discrimination 
The plurality summarily concluded that the self-care 
provision—as a preventative measure for the inevitable employment 
discrimination that would result from a FMLA that only included a 
family-care provision—could not come close to passing the Boerne 
test.
127
 The dissent, by reiterating Congress’s findings regarding the 
probable discrimination and outlining the law’s restrictions, declared 
that it passed the test.
128
 Since neither the plurality nor the dissent 
compared this theory to other cases in which the Court had applied 
Boerne’s congruent and proportionality test, an analysis is in 
order.
129
 A quick look at four cases that applied the test to other laws 
in which Congress sought to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity 
reveals that the self-care provision indeed should have passed the 
test. 
First, in Boerne, the Court held that Congress exceeded its 
Section 5 power when it passed the Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).
130
 The RFRA prohibited the 
“‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise 
of religion even if the burden result[ed] from a rule of general 
applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden 
‘(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
government interest.’”
131
 The expansive nature of the RFRA 
“ensure[d] intrusion at every level of government” and was “so out 
 
 124. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 125. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738–40 (2003). 
 126. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1340 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 1336 (plurality opinion). 
 128. Id. at 1345–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 129. See id. at 1336 (plurality opinion); id. at 1345–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 130. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 131. Id. at 515–16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993)). 
  
Winter 2013] FREE TO DISCRIMINATE 771 
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it 
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”
132
 The legislation put so high a burden on 
states that the Court held that Congress had attempted to make 
substantive changes in constitutional protections, rather than pass 
preventive legislation.
133
 Here, the self-care provision is not 
expansive.
134
 It reaches only employers that have eligible employees, 
and it requires them to provide medical leave only for a documented 
disability and for only the number of days that the person’s doctor 
proscribes, not to exceed twelve weeks.
135
 This is far from the vast 
intrusion of the RFRA. 
Second, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
136
 the Court held 
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
137
 
was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power to abrogate 
states’ immunity. The ADEA targeted age discrimination.
138
 Age is 
not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause and age 
discrimination does not violate “the Fourteenth Amendment if the 
age classification . . . is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”
139
 The ADEA was not congruent and proportional to 
remedy or prevent unconstitutional behavior because its target—age 
discrimination—is reviewed for rational basis and the behavior is 
often found to be constitutional.
140
 Unlike the ADEA, which targets 
an unprotected class, the FMLA targets gender, a protected class.
141
 
The aim of the self-care provision, then, is at primarily 
unconstitutional behavior—gender discrimination in employment as 
a result of the pervasive stereotype that would cause employers to 
view the family-care provisions as a benefit for women only.
142
 
Third, in United States v. Morrison,
143
 the Court held that a 
federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence was 
 
 132. Id. at 532. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Coleman 132 S. Ct. at 1346–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. 
 136. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
 138. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66. 
 139. Id. at 83. 
 140. See id. at 82–83. 
 141. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1349 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 1347. 
 143. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power.
144
 Congress 
passed the law in order to combat the pervasive bias against these 
victims in state justice systems.
145
 The law targeted unconstitutional 
behavior; however, it was not congruent and proportional to this goal 
because the law’s consequences affected the perpetrators of the 
violence, rather than the perpetrators of the bias.
146
 In contrast, the 
self-care provision targets employers, and the consequences affect 
employers.
147
 
Finally, in Tennessee v. Lane,
148
 the Court held that Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Section 5 power.
149
 Title II was aimed at the “pervasive 
unequal treatment in the administration of state services and 
programs.”
150
 Title II reached a broad range of conduct and could 
potentially have vast applicability, but it was nonetheless congruent 
and proportional to the harm it sought to remedy because it required 
states only to make reasonable modifications and “only when the 
individual seeking modification [was] otherwise eligible for the 
service.”
151
 Although Congress did not phrase the self-care provision 
to require only “reasonable” leave, it provided restrictions that 
effectuate the reasonableness of the requirement. Employers are 
required only to provide medical leave for a documented disability, 
only for the number of days that the person’s doctor prescribes, not 
to exceed twelve weeks, and only for employees that meet eligibility 
requirements.
152
 
Comparing the Court’s holdings in these cases provides ample 
support that the Court could and should have held that the self-care 
provision was congruent and proportional to the goal of preventing 
the inevitable gender discrimination that would result from passing 
the FMLA with the family-care provisions alone. 
 
 144. Id. at 627. 
 145. Id. at 619. 
 146. Id. at 626. 
 147. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006), declared unconstitutional in part by Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
 148. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 149. Id. at 533–34. 
 150. Id. at 524. 
 151. Id. at 532. 
 152. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1346–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The family-care provisions of the FMLA were framed to ensure 
equal treatment of women in the workplace. But without the self-care 
provision, the FMLA would have likely resulted in unequal 
opportunity for women. Gender discrimination in treatment and 
opportunity are both violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
would make legislation remedying each a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Section 5 power if done in a congruent and proportional 
manner. The plurality dismissed this argument, stating that 
“Congress must rely on more than abstract generalities to subject the 
States to suits for damages.”
153
 But the stereotype was neither 
abstract nor general. The plurality needed to look no further than the 
Court’s decision in Hibbs.
154
 The congressional findings that the 
Hibbs Court confirmed were enough to uphold the self-care 
provision, as were the additional findings that Justice Ginsburg 
illuminated in the dissent.
155
 But, the plurality characterized these 
findings as a “few fleeting references.”
156
 Because of this 
characterization, states cannot be subject to suits for money damages 
when they violate the FMLA’s self-care provision. Accordingly, 
there is no financial incentive for states to adhere to the self-care 
provision, which will encourage them to discriminate when hiring. 
Post-Coleman, states are free to violate the self-care provision, a 
provision that applies equally to men and women. On the other hand, 
there is a cost to violations of the family-care provisions, provisions 
that stereotypically apply to women only. Thus the states now have a 
financial incentive to discriminate in hiring, and the opportunities for 
women will accordingly become unequal when it comes to public 
employment. Because this result completely thwarts the very purpose 
of the FMLA, the Coleman plurality got it wrong.  
 
 153. Id. at 1337 (plurality opinion). 
 154. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–30 (2003) (finding that (1) states 
had laws based on the belief that “a woman is, and should remain, ‘the center of home and family 
life’”; (2) states felt withholding women’s opportunities were justified; (3) state gender 
discrimination had not ceased as a result of previous legislation; and (4) the gender discrimination 
was a result of “reliance on such stereotypes” (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)). 
 155. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 1336 (plurality opinion) (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644 (1999)). 
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